Reproductive rights in South Africa have traditionally focused on the rights of individuals to avoid reproduction. However, with an increase in the use of assisted reproductive technologies (ART), there has been a shift in the focus on reproductive rights from the rights of individuals to avoid reproduction to the rights of individuals to reproduce noncoitally.
The second question raised pertains to the impact of this right on specific forms of ART, namely mitochondrial transfer, posthumous reproduction and embryo donation. While the first two forms of ART would meet the criteria set down in AB, embryo donation would not. Individuals denied access to embryo donation could thus not rely on either the right to reproductive autonomy or the right to privacy to aid them. Fortunately the existing legal framework provides some assistance to these individuals, although sadly the same legislative framework does not support the use of mitochondrial transfer and posthumous reproduction. In this respect there is incongruence between rights and legislation, which has only been exacerbated by the recent Constitutional Court decision. What is thus needed is clarity on the meaning of certain rights in respect of certain forms of ART as well as legislative reform to reflect the clarified position.
Introduction
Reproductive rights 1 in South Africa have traditionally focused on the rights of individuals to access contraceptives and sterilisation procedures, and to terminate pregnancies within the time frames stipulated by legislation. 2 In other words, the focus historically has been on the right of individuals to avoid procreation. 3 However, with an increase in the use of Assisted Reproductive Technologies (hereafter ART), there has been a shift in the focus on reproductive rights. 4 The emphasis is now on the rights of individuals to reproduce noncoitally and the extent of their reproductive freedom. 5 As observed, rights mean very little unless supported by a legal framework which gives effect to these rights. 6 In the light of ART's emphasis on the individual's reproductive rights, this article examines the international and local legal framework to determine whether it gives full effect to this right. This article is divided into four parts. After providing some background on ART and the definition of reproductive rights, the article proceeds to identify possible bases for such a right under international law. It then considers similar bases under South African law. It then evaluates existing legislation to determine whether such a right exists, and if it does, the extent to which the current legal framework gives effect to this right. The article then concludes by making recommendations for the way forward. But first, it is necessary to define ART and identify some of the advances occurring within this field.
Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART)
ART was initially born out of a desire to assist individuals to overcome infertility. 7 But what started out as an attempt to assist the infertile has over time morphed into a field that surpasses ordinary human expectation. Today ART can be used not only to eliminate infertility, but also for purposes of "Noncoital" is defined by the Collins Dictionary as reproduction "not involving sexual intercourse". In some instances this type of reproduction may be referred to as "asexual reproduction". Collins Dictionary date unknown http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/noncoital. The former term is preferable to "asexual reproduction" as the latter is defined as "involving or reproducing by reproductive processes (as cell division, spore formation, fission, or budding) that do not involve the union of individuals or gametes" or as " [r] eproduction occurring without the sexual union of male and female gametes". See MerriamWebster date unknown http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/asexual and Dictionary.com date unknown http://www.dictionary.com/browse/asexualreproduction. The latter term is problematic as it incorporates only certain forms of noncoital reproduction such as cloning where reproduction does not involve the union of gametes. 6 Olaniyan Corruption and Human Rights Law 172. 7 Bell 2006 AJETS 16. The WHO date unknown http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/topics/infertility/definitions/en/ clinically defines infertility as "a disease of the reproductive system defined by the failure to achieve a clinical pregnancy after 12 months or more of regular unprotected sexual intercourse"; and as "the inability of a sexually active, non-contracepting couple to achieve pregnancy in one year". Kruger and Botha Clinical Gynaecology 337 define infertility (or subfertility, as it is also known) as "the inability to achieve pregnancy after one year of adequate sexual exposure". Asch and Marmor "Assisted Reproduction" 5 further define infertility as "an inability to sustain a pregnancy, which is demonstrated by repeat miscarriages".
C VAN NIEKERK PER / PELJ 2017 (20) 4 embryo research 8 and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD The definition provided by the WHO refers only to gestational surrogacy, but traditional surrogacy also involves some form of ART. The differences between the two forms of surrogacy are defined as follows: Gestational or full surrogacy describes those circumstances in which use is made of a surrogate mother but without recourse to her gametes, while traditional or partial surrogacy occurs where the surrogate provides both her gametes and her body as a conduit in the reproductive process. See Although there are alternate interpretations such as the one adopted by Kharb 2006 IJLHE 1, who includes artificial insemination under the umbrella of ART. This stance is similar to the one adopted in the definition of artificial fertilisation provided in the Regulations, which includes artificial insemination. Another interesting observation that can be made regarding this definition is that it includes only gestational surrogacy which involves using a surrogate but without having recourse to her gametes. This type of surrogacy is different from traditional surrogacy where the surrogate provides both her gametes and her body in the reproductive process. Both of these forms of surrogacy usually involve a medical procedure listed above. It is thus interesting that the one form is included while the other is not. This scenario may for example present itself in instances where an individual is about to undergo cancer treatment which destroys reproductive cells. A trend has also started emerging among young career women who are extracting their eggs while they are in their twenties. Doing so allows them to focus on their careers until such time as they are ready to reproduce. The reason for this is that eggs are more viable the younger one is, which means that women who wait until they're older to procreate and do so naturally (ie without recourse to ART) may experience some difficulty in conceiving. In both of these instances the gametes are extracted and cryopreserved for later use. See for example Krans 2015 http://www.healthline.com/healthnews/women-freezing-eggs-so-they-can-work-now-and-have-kids-later-072015#2; Parry 2015 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-3078210/Number-womenfreezing-eggs-soars-400-one-year-careers-prioritised-motherhood.html; and Rushton 2014 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/jobs/10681161/Women-are-freezing-theireggs-as-part-of-a-career-strategy.html.
25
This option is more commonly found in couples undergoing fertility treatment. Where gametes have been fertilised to create embryos, some of these embryos will be transferred to the recipient for procreation, while the remaining embryos may be stored for future use. At present reg 12 allows for the transfer of only three embryos at one time. This is the norm unless there is a medical reason to transfer more. This may be the case as there are less likely to be additional parties involved in the reproductive process who may assert rights in respect of the child.
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In each of these cases, matters are complicated by the added element of donation.
29
This is possibly because of the ethical concerns raised. The ethical concerns for each form of ART identified will be discussed below. C VAN NIEKERK PER / PELJ 2017 (20) 7 This technique, which allows women to produce genetically-related offspring without transferring genetic defects, involves the removal of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
… from a patient's egg or embryo containing unhealthy mitochondria to a donor's egg or embryo containing healthy mitochondria. 31
This procedure is not currently allowed other than in the United Kingdom, which in 2015 passed legislation permitting research in this field. 32 Mitochondrial donation has enormous legal implications which have yet to be resolved as it results in the production of a child with three genetic parents, 33 instead of two. 34 The process becomes even more complicated if it is used in conjunction with surrogacy, which is already complicated by the possibility of a third, fourth or fifth party in the reproductive process. 35
Embryo donation
Embryo donation arises in instances where parties have fertilised their gametes but have elected to cryopreserve them for future use. 36 Where these individuals later decide that they would not like to use the excess embryos themselves, they may choose to donate them to other parties, who will use them in the reproductive process. These include the genetic mother, genetic father and the donor who contributed their healthy mitochondria.
34
Mitochondrial donation also raises serious ethical concerns. These include: concerns about safety, the creation of three-parent babies, the impact on a child's identity and the implications for society. Dimond 2015 British Medical Bulletin 175. 35 Fasouliotis and Schenker 1999 Human Reproduction Update 26. However, strictly speaking this may become possible in future in instances where a husband or wife is infertile, the other spouse is not, yet is a carrier for a life-threatening disease which they would prefer not to transfer to their offspring. In these instances mitochondrial donation of either the surrogate or a donor may provide the answer to producing a child that is at least partly connected to one of the commissioning parents. 36 Robertson 1995 Fertility and Sterility 885. 37 Robertson 1995 Fertility and Sterility 886. 38 Some of the ethical concerns include disclosure to the child, the mixing of embryos and gametes from different sources, and the issue of whether there should be compensation for donated embryos. See Robertson 1995 Fertility and Sterility 888-890. 39 Some of the legal concerns include whether embryo donation should be treated as a gamete donation or an adoption; and what the status of the child is and the resultant rearing rights and duties that arise in this case. See Robertson 1995 Fertility and Sterility 890-893. C VAN NIEKERK PER / PELJ 2017 (20) 8 according to Robertson. 40 The most recent concerns regarding embryo donation involve instances where embryos are being made to order. 41
Posthumous Reproduction (PHR)
PHR arises in instances where a party has donated his/her gametes prior to death and a recipient would like to use them thereafter. 42 This generally occurs in instances where a spouse has stored his/her gametes for future use, but dies and the surviving spouse wants to use them 43 or where a deceased child has donated its gametes to its parents and the parents wish to use the gametes to create grandchildren. 44 In each of these instances the individuals concerned are presumably exercising a right to reproduce, albeit noncoitally. 45 The question that needs to be answered is whether these forms of noncoital reproduction are protected under international law and South African law. In order to answer this question it is first necessary to define reproductive rights and to consider the extent to which these rights are protected both locally and internationally.
Reproductive rights defined
The term "reproductive rights" was first coined in 1984. 46 The next time it was used was at the International Conference on Population and 40 Robertson 1995 Fertility and Sterility 893. 41 This practice alone raises a host of legal and ethical concerns. [R]eproductive rights embrace certain human rights that are already recognised in national laws, international human rights documents and other consensus documents. These rights rest on the recognition of the basic right of all couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of their children and to have the information and means to do so, and the right to attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health. It also includes their right to make decisions concerning reproduction free from discrimination, coercion and violence, as expressed in human rights documents. 49 According to this definition reproductive rights may not be provided for expressly. 50 Instead they may be inferred from other rights that are already in existence. These existing rights include (but are not limited to) the right to make decisions regarding reproduction (or reproductive freedom), the right to non-discrimination and equal treatment, the right to information and the right to the highest standard of health. 51
In respect of the right to reproductive freedom, Blank suggests that these decisions typically fall into three categories. 52 These include deciding to have children, deciding not to do so, and deciding to have children of a particular quality and quantity. 53 The first category has been interpreted as including the acquisition of children by adoption and by means of natural 47 This conference was coordinated by the United Nations with the aim of creating a document, the Programme of Action, which would direct the United Nations Population Fund in its future approaches on population development. In other words there is no right to procreate or to avoid procreation. Instead these rights are manifestations of the rights mentioned above. This is confirmed by Packer Right to Reproductive Choice 14, who notes that reproductive rights do not exist "expressis verbis". Instead the term "reproductive rights" is a "shorthand way of referring to the 'right to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of [one's] children and to have access to information, education and means to enable [one] to exercise these rights' -rights which are provided expressis verbis in an international human rights treaty". (20) 10 conception. 54 The second category, which amounts to a decision to avoid reproduction, includes choosing to use contraceptives, terminating a pregnancy or being sterilised voluntarily. 55 The third category, which is arguably merely an extension of the first, 56 distinguishes between deciding on the quantity of children and the quality of children. The first component of this category is generally accepted in most human rights instruments, 57 while the second component has only recently received attention due to advancements in medical science. 58 It is this second component that is quite contentious and will be discussed in greater detail below.
PHR could arguably fall into the first category, 59 while mitochondrial donation and reproduction using donated embryos would potentially fall into the third category. 60
Reproductive rights under international law
Under international law, a distinction can be made between general provisions that recognise reproductive rights and specific provisions that recognise these rights. General provisions include the right to privacy and family life. Manifestations of this right can be found in Article 17 (1) It has yet to be determined whether this decision includes acquiring children by means of noncoital reproduction.
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Here a distinction must be made with coercive sterilisation, which is not an exercise of the right not to reproduce but a limitation of the right to reproduce.
56
This is because parties first need to decide to have children, before they can make a decision regarding the quality and quantity of their prospective offspring.
57
For a discussion, see s 4 below.
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An example of such advancement is karyomapping, which is used to detect and eliminate genetic abnormalities to allow "couples to avoid passing [a] disorder on to their offspring". See Illumina 2014 http://www.illumina.com/content/dam/illuminamarketing/documents/clinical/karyomapping -clinicians.pdf.
59
PHR is an expression of the decision to have children.
60
Mitochondrial donation is a case of deciding on the quality of one's offspring, while reproducing by means of donated embryos amounts to a decision regarding the quantity of one's offspring. Women (1979) art 16 provides: "1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: (e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights… ."
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
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Interestingly, the only court to consider the application of these rights within the realm of noncoital reproduction has been the ECtHR. For example, in Dickson v United Kingdom, 70 the ECtHR found that a person's right to use artificial insemination falls within the ambit of the Article 8 of the ECHR, which protects the right to respect for private and family life. While the plaintiff relied on both Article 8 and Article 12 (which protects the right to marry and found a family), the court did not feel the need to address the claim under Article 12 once it had found a violation of Article 8. The decision in this case suggests, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that noncoital reproduction may fall within the ambit of this right, more than any other. It is worth noting that similar cases involving noncoital reproduction also centred on the right contained in Article 8. 71 It is unclear, however, whether noncoital reproduction would similarly find protection under the right to found a family.
In respect of the three instances of noncoital reproduction that form the focus of this article, there is no case law to confirm that the right to privacy, or any other reproductive right for that matter, extends to mitochondrial donation. However, in Costa and Pavan v Italy, 72 which involved an Italian couple … who are healthy carriers of cystic fibrosis and wanted, with the help of medically-assisted procreation and genetic screening, to avoid transmitting the disease to their offspring, the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 8. 73 The argument could thus be made that this right could similarly extend to mitochondrial donation. In the same vein it could be argued that legislation that prohibits PHR constitutes a violation of the right to private and family life. This form of noncoital reproduction is, however, more complex, as it is dependent on the consent of the deceased person. 74 Where such consent has been given, it could be argued that a refusal to allow reproduction violates the applicant's rights. The converse would be true where such consent has not been obtained. 75 In the light of the aforementioned it can be concluded that even at an international level, while provisions do exist which recognise individual's reproductive rights, some may not be comprehensive enough to recognise an individual's right to make use of ART to facilitate reproduction in all the ways mentioned in this article. This raises the question whether South African law is any different. To answer this question, the legal position in South Africa will be considered next.
Reproductive rights under South African law
The legislative history of reproductive rights in South African can be divided into three phases: legislation prior to 1996, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution) and legislation after 1996.
dead". In this instance the court would not permit his wife to use the sperm as he had not consented prior to his death. 
Legislation prior to 1996
Prior to the promulgation of the Constitution, legislation pertaining to reproduction consisted primarily of the Abortion and Sterilisation Act. 81 This Act for the first time permitted pregnancies to be terminated legally. Although the Act had been intended to prevent persons from obtaining "clandestine abortions", 82 it had the opposite effect, as its provisions permitting abortion were so narrowly formulated that "the new law actually made it more difficult to procure abortions". 83 The result of this was that reproductive rights were narrowly interpreted and recognised only the right not to have children in limited circumstances. 84
The 1996 Constitution
With the advent of the Constitution, reproductive rights have found protection under section 12 (2) (20) 15 favour. 89 This judgment effectively confirmed that reproductive autonomy, which finds protection under section 12(2)(a) of the Constitution, includes noncoital reproduction as well. 90 However, the later decision by the majority of the Constitutional Court had a different outcome. In this decision the majority found that section 294 does not violate the applicant's right to reproductive autonomy as the right contained in section 12(2)(a) pertains to an individual's own body and not that of another woman. 91 The attack on section 294 thus failed. The implication of this decision is that while section 12(2)(a) protects the right to reproduce noncoitally, it does so only if the parties themselves are physically involved in the reproductive process, 92 presumably either by providing genetic material or by carrying the child. This effectively excludes individuals who cannot meet these criteria. As far as mitochondrial transfer and posthumous reproduction are concerned, these criteria would ostensibly be met. In each of these cases the parties concerned would provide the genetic material for the specific form of ART. Embryo donation is a different case as the recipients would not have the requisite genetic material but may be able to provide the womb required. 93 From the aforementioned it becomes apparent that the right to reproductive autonomy as contained in section 12(2)(a) is available to everyone 94 provided that their own bodies are engaged in the act of reproduction. This finding raises a number of concerns. The first relates to the right to psychological integrity and the second relates to the fixation regarding the use of one's own gametes. As far as the first issue is concerned, reference is made to the wording of section 12(2) of the Constitution which protects the right to bodily and psychological integrity. The majority of the Constitutional Court appears to have conflated these concepts into one. Is it not possible that legislation which prevents an individual from exercising their choice in respect of reproduction, can impact on their psychological integrity without necessarily having a similar impact on their bodily integrity? For a long time the psyche was not thought of as being part of the body. 95 The reference to both bodily and psychological integrity could as such serve as recognition that both the body and the psyche are protected. This is not 89 AB ConCourt case para 15.
90
This is consistent with the views of Van Niekerk 2015 PELJ 405, who observes that there is nothing in the wording of s 12(2(a) to suggest that the right includes only reproduction by natural means or that it is available to fertile individuals only.
91
AB ConCourt case para 313.
92
AB ConCourt case paras 314-315.
93
In certain instances of embryo donation, the recipient may not be able to provide the genetic material but may be able to provide the uterus "to undergo pregnancy and childbirth". Robertson 1995 Fertility and Sterility 885. 94 Emphasis added.
95
Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 47, 306.
C VAN NIEKERK PER / PELJ 2017 (20) 16 to say that the two terms are synonymous and that an infringement of one automatically translates into an infringement of the other. While this may be true of the body, the same is not true of the psyche. So while it is possible to inflict harm in a way that infringes both one's bodily integrity as well as one's psychological integrity, it is equally possible that only one's psychological integrity is compromised without an accompanying infringement of one's bodily integrity. A number of cases have recognised and awarded damages to the victims of such harm. 96 To now find otherwise would render decades of case law redundant. Based on a violation of psychological integrity alone, the applicant's claim in AB should thus have succeeded.
As far as the second issue is concerned, the provision in section 12(2)(b) is different from provision in paragraph (a). While paragraph (b) specifically makes reference to "security in and control over their body", paragraph (a) contains no similar requirement. Ostensibly, making a decision regarding reproduction may thus involve the assistance of others in the reproductive process. 97 The need to provide one's own gametes would thus be unnecessary in these circumstances. 98 If the interpretation adopted by the majority is to be followed, then all forms of noncoital reproduction are not protected by section 12(2)(a). This suggests that this provision is not flexible enough to accommodate advancements in medical technology and may thus need to be amended or at the very least be interpreted more broadly in future. Sadly, while the majority in the Constitutional Court recognised that this case provided it with the "first opportunity to vindicate" the right contained in section 12(2)(a) within the context of surrogacy, 99 it did a poor job of doing so. So where does this leave individuals like the applicant in AB?
The only other possible alternative would be a reliance on the right to privacy, which was the approach adopted in the ECtHR. This right, which is 
97
Provided that an individual is able to engage others to reproduce on their behalf, without coercion and with their consent, the provision in paragraph (a) would be satisfied.
98
The fixation with using one's own gametes does not make sense when medical science makes it possible to reproduce with assistance. This position is to be distinguished from the choice exercised in cases of terminations of pregnancy which is also protected under s 12(2)(a) and which is dependent on the individual being pregnant personally. The existence of ART does not require one to be pregnant or to contribute personally in the reproductive process.
99
AB ConCourt case para 309. The reality is that section 294 of the Children's Act violates the rights of individuals to exercise their reproductive choice and to do so freely. The limitations of these rights are not reasonable and justifiable and in this respect I am compelled to agree with the minority judgment. 110 The internal mechanisms for surrogacy agreements which are regulated by the Children's Act serve as a filter for unsuitable candidates. 111 The applicant in AB should at least have been awarded the same opportunity as others to exercise her reproductive autonomy. Whether or not she would be successful in carrying out her decision is another matter entirely, as section 12(2)(a) does not guarantee the right to give effect to a decision, 112 merely to make one. In this respect, the Constitutional Court failed her.
Despite the recent judgment, it is submitted that a denial of certain forms of noncoital reproduction do constitute a violation of privacy. This would be consistent with the approach adopted by the ECtHR. In this respect South Africa took a step backwards as far as the interpretation of certain rights is concerned. What is thus needed is an exploration of the meaning of these rights within the context of noncoital reproduction.
Legislation after 1996
Since the Constitution entered into force, a number of acts have been passed which give effect to the right contained in section 12 (2) In respect of embryo donation: the Regulations state that parties who make use of donated gametes may have repeated recourse to the same genetic material, provided that a particular donor may not be used more than twelve times. 124 There are, however, no corresponding provisions pertaining to embryo donation. Presumably the same rule applies to the use of embryos. Furthermore, the fact that consent may be obtained from the Minister to dispense with this rule suggests that a refusal on the part of the Minister could result in an argument that there has been an infringement of the recipients' rights. In this instance, the existence of this provision potentially confirms the existence of a right to reproduce noncoitally. From the aforementioned, it is evident that while certain pieces of legislation clearly acknowledge the right not to have children, the same cannot unequivocally be said regarding the right to reproduce noncoitally. At most, legislation suggests that such a right exists. Yet full effect is not given to this right in certain cases of noncoital reproduction. It can thus be concluded that the existing legal framework for such a right is deficient in certain respects.
Conclusion
Developments in medical science and an increase in the use of noncoital reproduction have necessitated a shift in the way that reproductive rights have historically been defined. What was traditionally understood as incorporating a right to avoid reproduction, now potentially includes a right to reproduce noncoitally. At an international level, this new right may find protection under the right to private and family life; while at a local level it could form part of the right to make decisions regarding reproduction or the right to privacy, although the recent decision by the majority of the Constitutional Court in AB v Minister of Social Development suggests otherwise. Clearly the decision by the majority is weak and open to criticism.
That said, the uncertainty regarding the constitutional basis of such a right suggests that an exposition of this right is thus needed, one which considers the scope and content of this right. Once clarity is achieved on this score, existing legislation should either be amended or new legislation drafted which gives full effect to a right to reproduce noncoitally. 
Bibliography
International instruments
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) 
